JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. English Romantic criticism of Shakespeare never tires of reminding us that he keeps to the high road of morality, and Coleridge, "adverting to the opinion of a Greek writer . . . that none but a good man could be a great poet, . . . concurred, . . . and thought, moreover, that moral excellence was necessary to the perfection of the understanding and the taste" (MC, p. 225).1 For Coleridge, then, Shakespeare's moral nature was never suspect, and the mere fact that the plays delighted successive audiences proved, in his view, that they and their author were rich in goodness (but not, he elsewhere indicates, in goodyness [MC, p. 427]), for it is impossible "to keep up any pleasurable interest in a tale in which there is no goodness of heart" (MC, p. 55). Thus, Coleridge's aesthetics are intimately related to his moral values, and we should not be surprised to find that he is uneasy when in the presence of several of the plays which Willard Farnham has recently characterized as representing Shakespeare's "Tragic Frontier". Some of the difficulties that critics encounter in these dramas, where the heroes are so deeply tainted that they cannot merely be said to have a tragic "flaw" or to "miss the mark", may owe their origin to the aesthetic inferiority of the works themselves, but we can clearly see that morality rather than aesthetics (however intimately the two may be related) is the cause of the embarrassment Coleridge exhibits in his remarks on Coriolanus and Timon of Athens. Of the latter, "his admiration of some parts . . . was unbounded; but he maintained that it was, on the whole, a painful and disagreeable production, because it gave only a disadvantageous picture of human nature, very inconsistent with what, he firmly believed, was our great poet's real view of the characters of his fellowcreatures. .. . Coleridge could not help suspecting that the subject might have been taken up under some temporary feeling of vexation and disappointment" (SC, I, 85). Surprisingly, however, Shakespeare's hero-villains were less of a problem to Coleridge than were the out-and-out villains. And this was so, not only because the non-heroic villains act with unmitigated villainy, but also because the good characters, whose opinions we must, in general, honor and make our But why did villains pose a special problem? The answer, perhaps, is partly to be found in T. E. Hulme's definition of a Romantic as one who does not believe in the fall of man. In a sense Hulme's statement is just, though Coleridge, when in a theological mood, quite literally did believe that man had fallen and was in a condition of sin.2 Romanticism is fundamentally optimistic, and its view of man and the universe as essentially good leaves little room for the powers of darkness. Moreover, most philosophic systems tend to exclude the possibility of tragedy, if for no other reason than that they explain too much, whereas the genuinely tragic poet's awareness and sensitivity exceed his knowledge. The "closed" system which the philosopher strives to create almost always includes an explanation of the cause of evil, and once evil has been explained, it rarely can hold its place in tragedy. Romanticism, with its organic view of nature, with its concept of a continually evolving world, and, most important, with its principle of reconciliation of opposites, is incompatible with the tragic view.3 Now, Coleridge, the most philosophic of all the English Romantics, was deeply attached to these views, and they inform much of his criticism. His analysis of Richard II, for example, with its emphasis on the first scene as containing "the germ of all the after events" (SC, I, I53; see also I, 68; I, I44; I, I48-149), is based on his view of organic development, while his description of the end of Romeo and Juliet is indebted to his concept of the reconciliation of opposites. "A beautiful close-poetic justice indeed! All are punished! The spring and winter meet, and winter assumes the character of spring, spring the sadness of winter" (SC, I, 12).
SHAKESPEARE QUARTERLY
own, clearly indicate their disapproval. Moreover, the villain of the Elizabethan stage did not have the reluctance of his modern counterpart to reveal his inmost thoughts. Today's theatre-goer, nourished on the predominantly naturalistic drama of the last fifty years, has difficulty in accepting the unabashed confessions of a black heart. And just so, Coleridge, who, like all his contemporaries, had a relatively slight knowledge of Elizabethan stage conventions, found himself continually disquieted by Shakespeare's villains. Furthermore, his interest in what was later to be called psychology caused him to seek in the drama realistic portrayals of the workings of the human mind.
But why did villains pose a special problem? The answer, perhaps, is partly to be found in T. E. Hulme's definition of a Romantic as one who does not believe in the fall of man. In a sense Hulme's statement is just, though Coleridge, when in a theological mood, quite literally did believe that man had fallen and was in a condition of sin.2 Romanticism is fundamentally optimistic, and its view of man and the universe as essentially good leaves little room for the powers of darkness. Moreover, most philosophic systems tend to exclude the possibility of tragedy, if for no other reason than that they explain too much, whereas the genuinely tragic poet's awareness and sensitivity exceed his knowledge. The "closed" system which the philosopher strives to create almost always includes an explanation of the cause of evil, and once evil has been explained, it rarely can hold its place in tragedy. Romanticism, with its organic view of nature, with its concept of a continually evolving world, and, most important, with its principle of reconciliation of opposites, is incompatible with the tragic view.3 Now, Coleridge, the most philosophic of all the English Romantics, was deeply attached to these views, and they inform much of his criticism. His analysis of Richard II, for example, with its emphasis on the first scene as containing "the germ of all the after events" (SC, I, I53; see also I, 68; I, I44; I, I48-149), is based on his view of organic development, while his description of the end of Romeo and Juliet is indebted to his concept of the reconciliation of opposites. "A beautiful close-poetic justice indeed! All are punished! The spring and winter meet, and winter assumes the character of spring, spring the sadness of winter" (SC, I, 12).
That the principle of reconciliation of opposites, if too tenaciously held, is fatal to tragedy can clearly be seen in the writings of Goethe. For him, opposites meet, good and evil are ultimately reconciled, partly because evil is necessary for the existence of good, and tragedy ceases to exist. Faust is not a tragedy (though Goethe called it one) simply because the ending is unconditionally happy, and we are not permitted to have a consciousness of the waste that Bradley finds essential to tragedy because we are told to rejoice in nature's method of developing man through a devious course. ' 
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philosophical opinions to intrude quite so obviously into his dramatic criticism, but one cannot help noticing the relative lack of attention to the ends of the tragedies he discusses, a lack which cannot merely be explained by insisting that the Romantics were interested in character and not in plot. The plain truth seems to be that Coleridge was not at ease in discussing tragedy, however perceptive he may have been as a student of poetry. His comments, for example, on the Player's Speech in Hamlet, or on the opening act of that play, show an acute mind ranging over material which it finds congenial, in contrast to his few half-hearted endeavors to study the tragic outcomes of the plays whose opening scenes he found so fascinating. Nor can this lack of attention to the catastrophes be explained away by invoking Coleridge's dilatory temperament, for the problem is not that he never got to the ends of the plays, but rather that for the most part he preferred to talk-on the platform and off-about their beginnings.
Coleridge's attitude toward evil, and specifically toward Shakespeare's villains, entails further complications. He was a philosopher, and his aesthetics were closely bound up with his metaphysics as well as his ethics. His view of artistic creation, briefly, is this: the poet portrays the universal ideal through the particular. "Shakespeare's characters, from Othello and Macbeth down to Dogberry and the Gravedigger, may be termed ideal realities. They are not the things themselves, so much as abstracts of the things, which a great mind takes into itself, and there naturalises them to its own conception. Take Dogberry: are no important truths there conveyed, no admirable lessons taught, and no valuable allusions made to reigning follies, which the poet saw must for ever reign? He is not the creature of the day, to disappear with the day, but the representative and abstract of truth which must ever be true, and of humour which must ever be humourous" (SC, II, i62). Coleridge is here setting forth a doctrine of Ideas which is obviously Platonic in origin. And though he alludes to an "idea" of folly, his philosophic principles, especially his adherence to the doctrine of reconciliation, will not allow him to believe in an "idea" of villainy, any more than Plato, in the Parmenides, would allow that there could be an "idea" of dirt.
One more point must be added to what is already a long preamble to a tale. The artist, according to Coleridge, employs one of two processes in the creative operation. The dramatist may create a character on the basis of his limited observation, that is, select and combine details from persons with whom he has come into contact, or he may employ the superior method of constructing his characters from aspects of his infinitely varied self. This latter method was the one generally employed by Shakespeare, according to Coleridge. "It was Shakespeare's prerogative to have the universal which is potentially in each particular, opened out to him in the homo generalis, not as an abstraction of observation from a variety of men, but as the substance capable of endless modifications, of which his own personal existence was but one, and to use this one as the eye that beheld the other, and as the tongue that could convey the discovery" (MC, p. 44). Coleridge goes on to clarify his point and to warn the dramatist against drawing from his particular existence. What is advocated is a creative process which operates not on a thing merely observed, and thus only partially known, but on an aspect of the protean creator himself. Thus "Shakespeare [was able] to paint I2 SHAKESPEARE QUARTERLY truly, and according to the colouring of nature, a vast number of personages by the simple force of meditation: he had only to imitate certain parts of his own character, or to exaggerate such as existed in possibility, and they were at once true to nature, and fragments of the divine mind that drew them" (SC, II, II7) .5 Over and over again in Coleridge's Shakespeare criticism we hear that the truly great artist-and Shakespeare is for Coleridge, of course, the greatest-contains a spirit "which has the same ground with nature", and that the artist who merely imitates external nature produces "masks only, not forms breathing life" (BL, II, 258). In short, "Shakespeare describes feelings which no observation could teach. Shakespeare made himself all characters; he left out parts of himself, and supplied what might have been in himself" (SC, II, I7) *6
We have now, however briefly, journeyed through the narrows and the steeps of the relevant parts of Coleridge's aesthetic theory, and are at last in a position to see the problem he has posed for himself with regard to Shakespeare's villains. If the finest method of creation is by meditation upon some aspects of the self, if the great artist portrays only what he knows, and the surest key to knowledge is not observation but a study of the particular in the universal self, and-most important-if "to know is to resemble, when we speak of objects out of ourselves, even as within ourselves to learn is, according to Plato, only to recollect" (BL, IV, 259), then how can we explain Shakespeare's astounding success in portraying villains? Here is the dilemma in which Coleridge found himself, and Coleridge's attempts at a solution are what will occupy our attention. Never one to permit the rules of consistency to hamper him, and unashamed to offer the thought of a moment as the product of Truth long sought and at last captured, Coleridge hit upon a variety of possible explanations.
The one premise that Coleridge never alters, nor is ever inclined in the slightest to alter, is the moral nature of Shakespeare, for he firmly believed that a poet's "heart must be pure" (MC, p. 427; see also SC, II, i6; II, 34-38). Perhaps the simplest way of solving the problem, then, was to deny that there was a problem, and this is, in effect, what Coleridge did when he announced, in the course of a lecture in i8ii, that Shakespeare "became Othello, and therefore spoke like him. Shakespeare became, in fact, all beings but the vicious" (SC, II, 204). Taken at its face value, and in conjunction with some of the ideas already presented here, this statement allows for two alternatives: either Shakespeare's villains were created not by meditation but by observation, and hence are necessarily inferior, artistically, to his virtuous characters, or they are not really so villainous as we supposed. In fact, their villainy might conceivably be denied altogether, and that Coleridge held this view-at least for an instant-is lent some support by his comment that Shakespeare "never portrayed [avarice], for avarice is a factitious passion" (SC, II, 204). But surely Coleridge has overlooked, rather than ameliorated, the characters of Timon's "trencher-friends", and Alcibiades' mistresses, Timandra and Phrynia, who will "do anything for gold". If Coleridge over-stated his point, he was quite right in suggesting that avarice 5 Goethe expressed a similar thought: "All the characters of Sophocles bear something of that great poet's lofty soul; and it is the same with the characters of Shakespeare" (Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann [ 
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is not easily found in Shakespeare's characters. Avarice, however, is but one of the seven deadly sins, and though Coleridge could forget its infrequent appearance in Shakespeare's plays, could he close one eye and squint the other in such a way as to change black into white? But how much black is there in Shakespeare? That Shakespeare is against sin has been clear to almost all critics, and even Dr. Johnson, who hesitated for a moment, ultimately agreed that Shakespeare keeps, in Coleridge's famous phrase, "at all times the high road of life" (SC, II, 266). Coleridge was aware that although the life-web of Shakespeare's characters is of a mingled yarn, good and ill together, nevertheless, in the dramas "vice never walked, as it were, in twilight" (SC, II, 268).
We may agree that Shakespeare portrayed characters who can be fairly termed "villains", and we may further agree that Coleridge, except perhaps in rare moments of forgetfulness, or of temporary blindness when he was "talking for victory", would find himself in accord with us, so long as our opinion was thus broadly stated. And if we were to utilize Alfred Harbage's four categories, "people who are indubitably good", "people good in the main but not proof against temptation or free from flaw", "people bad in the main but with compensating moral qualities or an extenuating background", and "people indubitably bad",7 we would find that Coleridge would not generally take exception to our distribution, and he would surely not be reluctant to separate the good from the bad, the morally acceptable from the morally reprehensible, if the four categories were reduced to two. When, however, we seek to categorize some figures as "indubitably bad" as opposed to others who can be seen against "an extenuating background", we are on thin ice, chiefly because Shakespeare himself does not always make such distinctions. Characters in a drama are usually drawn rather broadly, and Shakespeare's, however subtle compared with those of most dramatists, are less complex than, say, the figures in a Proust novel. But to how many of them can the melodramatic tag "arrant villain" be applied character who merits the name of villain. There may be no real man who is so black as a villain in tragedy, but that objection is not relevant here. A drama consists of an artist's perceptions and insights, and these are of necessity communicated through numerous conventions. As Coleridge himself puts it, art is an "abridgment of nature" (BL, II, 262). But the conventional aspect of drama may easily be overemphasized. Shakespeare's characters-his villains no less than his heroes-often cannot be neatly pigeon-holed. They serve their proper dramatic function, are duly villainous when the plot demands that they be so, and yet somehow acquire larger dimensions. There is at least some truth in Coleridge's observation that "Shakespeare's characters are like those in life, to be inferred by the reader, not told to him.... If you take what . .. [a character's] friends say, you may be deceived-still more so, if his enemies; and the character himself sees himself thro' the medium of his character, not exactly as it is. But the clown or the fool will suggest a shrewd hint; and take all together, and the impression is right, and all [the spectators] have it" (SC, I, 227; see also I, 232). This view, however, fails to recognize sufficiently some of the basic Elizabethan conventions which Shakespeare employed. The Elizabethan villain, when he reveals his horrible intentions to the audience, is rarely seeing "himself thro' the medium of his character". On the contrary, he sees himself as the good people of the play see him or will ultimately see him, and as the dramatist wants the audience to see him. His soliloquies are, for the most part, to be taken at face value, their content alone is to be accepted, and the audience need not draw further conclusions about the nature of a man who would admit such things to himself-and aloud, too! Our experience, of course, is not likely to bring us into contact with any people so base as Shakespeare's basest villains. They are "out of nature", a judgment which the Romantics were reluctant to accept. Because Coleridge and his contemporaries were somewhat deficient in a knowledge of dramatic conventions, and because they were inclined to an optimistic view of human nature, they were perturbed at finding in Shakespeare's work characters who, when carefully examined in the closet, failed to pass the test of reality. Since most of Coleridge's comments on such characters are impromptu utterances, they vary. Generally they reveal his eagerness to place the villain against a background of extenuating circumstances, or, when this is impossible, to indicate that the particular character under discussion is unique among Shakespeare's creations, a lapse on the part of the dramatist, or, preferably, a creation which though strange to mortal eyes, may perhaps embody a truth we at the moment fail to perceive. Discussing this or that particular play, Coleridge is apt to characterize one of the villains of the piece as unique in the body of Shakespeare's workunique in his unmitigated evil. Thus, Oswald "the Steward (as a contrast to Kent) [is] the only character of utter unredeemable baseness in Shakespeare" (SC, I, 62).8 Yet a moment later Coleridge speaks of "the monster Goneril", 8 Oswald has not lacked for defenders. Dr. Johnson remarked-though in a puzzled toneon his fidelity, and Bradley and Kittredge also comment on this alleged virtue. Most recently Robert Metcalf Smith has put in "A Good Word for Oswald," in A Tribute to George Coffin Taylor, ed. Arnold Williams (Chapel Hill, i95i), pp. 62-66. But Oswald's fidelity is necessary for the exigencies of the plot. Furthermore, his is a fidelity which, in its dramatic context, is so deficient in the moral connotations which normally accompany that word that we should rather attribute to him a persistence in evil. He is a relatively minor figure, and our attitude toward him depends to " (SC, I, 62) .12 In contrast to the monstrosity of Regan and Goneril, "in Edmund, for whom passion, the sense of shame as a bastard, and ambition, offer some plausible excuses, Shakespeare has placed many redeeming traits. Edmund is what, under certain circumstances, any man of powerful intellect might be, if some other qualities and feelings were cut off" (SC, II, 354). Note, first of all, that Coleridge has, by his last phrase, implicitly brought Edmund into the company of those great dramatic creations which are the product of Shakespeare's meditation, not of his observation and copying. "The great prerogative of genius (and Shakespeare felt and availed himself of it) is now to swell itself to the dignity of a god, and now to subdue and keep dormant some part of that lofty nature, and to descend even to the lowest character-to become everything, in fact, but the vicious" (SC, II, I33 Coleridge, then, seeks to "naturalize" Edmund by endowing him with a "powerful intellect", on which certain forces operate to turn him to a course of evil. In short, Coleridge wishes to justify the psychology of Edmund's behavior. It is improbable, however, that Shakespeare was similarly concerned. The Elizabethans were much more willing than theatre-goers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to take the villain for what he seemed to be, and to pay closer attention to what he did than tov why he did it. Yet we cannot deny that Edmund is an impressive character; and he does seem to be endowed with that mental power which Coleridge attributes to him. This strength of intellect, however, is not given Edmund to make him psychologically consistent, but to lend force and immediacy to the power of evil, which will do such great harm before the drama is over. Shakespeare does not mitigate the destructive forces, nor does he build his tragedy on mere "mistakes". And he does not wish, at least in King Lear, to have evil reside solely within the character of the principal personage. The German critics of the last century, who were so anxious to portray Shakespeare as a dispenser of poetic justice, unduly emphasized the evil in the characters whom we may, speaking broadly, call "good", and tended to minimize the fact that Shakespeare often portrays evil as a force of terrible 12 Similarly, Coleridge observes (MC, p. 450) that the Second Murderer in Macbeths is not "a perfect monster" because he has been incensed by "the vile blows and buffets of the world' and therefore is reckless of what he does (IV. i. 107-i so). But Shakespeare is, I think, not so concerned with motivating the killer, as with telling the audience that here is a wretch who will not refuse to perform any deed of horror. We are assured, not that the murderer has reasons for being anti-social, but that Banquo will die. power, capable of bringing to material ruin much goodness. Edmund is drawn on an impressive scale because dramatically he must be impressive. If he seems to us to have a more powerful intellect than Don John of Much Ado, it is because Lear is a tragedy and the decorum requires a villain of stature, while in comedy the villain, if drawn too powerfully, may overshadow the happy outcome, as Shylock often does when misplayed today.
The characteristics that give weight to the villain are, in Shakespeare, not to be used as devices for explaining his villainy, but to make him a sufficiently We have already examined Coleridge's remarks on Edmund. Of King John and Lewis the Dauphin, he has nothing to say; of King Claudius, a bit; of Lady Macbeth, Iago, and Richard III, rather more.
Referring to Claudius' speech, "There's such divinity doth hedge a king", Coleridge observes: "Proof, as indeed all else is, that Shakespeare never intended us to see the king with Hamlet's eyes, tho', I suspect, the managers have long done so" (SC, I, 34) . Coleridge was quite right in seeing the danger of assuming one character to be what the others say, but his desire to find a complex personality in Claudius, as in each of Shakespeare's major figures, leads him to ignore or to slight some of the obvious signposts by which a dramatist must guide his audience."' Lady Macbeth, whom Dr. Johnson "detested", and in whom he could see "no nice discriminations of character", 17 was regarded more tolerantly by the Romantics. In her refusal to kill the king because he resembled her father, Coleridge found, as did Mrs. Siddons,'8 "confirmation that Shakespeare never meant Lady Macbeth more than Macbeth himself for [a] moral monster like Goneril" (MC, 449). He sought to show, in an elaborate analysis of her character, that she was not "out of nature and without conscience", and to explain her actions in terms of her "visionary and day-dreaming turn of mind". Furthermore, "a passage where she alludes to 'plucking her nipple from the boneless gums of her infant', though usually thought to prove a merciless and unwomanly nature, proves the direct opposite: she brings it as the most solemn enforcement to Macbeth of the solemnity of his promise to undertake the plot against Duncan. Had she so sworn, she would have done that which was most horrible to her feelings, rather than break the oath" (SC, II, 270-271). Coleridge here is overlooking the context of the speech, and he is eager to do this because he cannot conceive of any woman in life as monstrous. Lady Macbeth is not, in this speech, showing her belief in the binding power of an oath by announcing her willingness to sin horribly rather than break a vow-a vow which, by the way, could have no meaning in a moral universe-rather, she is devilishly urging her faltering husband to commit a monstrous crime. Perhaps Malcolm's description of Lady Macbeth, a "fiend-like queen", is too strong, but we should keep the early part of the play in mind and remember that if her deeds do not always equal her words, and her conscience ultimately torments her, there is nevertheless little evidence for the view that "her constant effort throughout the play was, if the expression may be forgiven, to bully conscience" (SC, II, 270-27I), and that she "sinks in the season of remorse" (SC, I, 72).
In only one instance, says Coleridge, has Shakespeare presented us with 16 It is perhaps significant that Coleridge's statement, "It is a common error to mistake the epithets applied by the dramatis personae to each other, as trsly descriptive of what the audience ought to see or know" (SC, I, 47), is used as a defense against accepting Othello as a Negro. I must point out, however, that the authenticity of this remark is suspect. See Raysor's note, SC, I, 47, n. i. -what our nature compels us to admire-in the mind, and  what is most detestable in the heart" (SC, I, 58) . Iago, he says, is Shakespeare's single presentation of "utter monstrosity-which . . . depends on the . . . absence of causes" (SC, I, 58). Iago is not a man among men, and Hamlet's soliloquy on death could not be spoken by this fiend, for it shows "too habitual a communion with the heart, that belongs or ought to belong, to all mankind" (SC, I, 29). A "passionless character", Iago in his soliloquy at the close of Act I displays "the motive-hunting of motiveless malignity. . . . In itself fiendish" (SC, I, 49) Iago is more fiend than man, and only the genius of Shakespeare, with "the opulence of its resources" (SC, I, 58), could have succeeded in so daring an endeavor.
"what is admirable
Richard III, on the other hand, is not sheer fiendish intellect,19 devoid of influences of the heart, but, on the contrary, his intellectual capabilities are closely related to his other faculties. In him Shakespeare has given not only the "character grown up and completed, but he has shown us its very source and generation. The inferiority of his person made the hero seek consolation and compensation in the superiority of his intellect; he thus endeavoured to counterbalance his deficiency. This striking feature is portrayed most admirably by Shakespeare, who represents Richard bringing forward his very defects and deformities as matters of boast" (SC, II, i8i). Iago and Richard, though differing, are closely allied, for in Richard, as in lago, there was "an overprizing of the intellectual above the moral character" (SC, II, 284). Both, in Coleridge's estimation, were men "who reverse the order of things, who place intellect at the head, whereas it ought to follow like geometry, to prove and to confirm" (SC, II, 286-287).
The heart has its reasons, says Pascal, which reason cannot know. And in his study of Shakespeare's villains, as in his other writings, Coleridge reveals that his allegiance is ultimately not to reason, but to the heart, not to the intellectual bent, which is so often disposed to evil, but to the moral nature of man. As one inclined to philosophic speculation and psychological investigation, however, he was not willing to drop the matter here. If mind and morality are not always reconciled now, as they must ultimately be, in his view, nevertheless both are powerful and demand attention. Why are Shakespeare's villains so fascinating? Because Shakespeare "had read nature too heedfully not to know that courage, intellect, and strength of character were the most impressive forms of power, and that to power in itself, without reference to any moral end, an inevitable admiration and complacency appertains, whether it be displayed in the conquests of a Napoleon or Tamerlane, or in the foam and thunder of a cataract" (SC, I, 58).
Thus, Coleridge holds, even the unique case of Iago's motiveless malignity is artistically acceptable, simply because of the tremendous truth in the brilliant portrait of unimpeded intellect. It is Iago, not Regan, who is anatomized, who is only part of a human being, a part which in life cannot subsist alone, but which Shakespeare has portrayed so knowingly that we gladly accept it and do not demand that the clarity of our view of the cell be obscured by presentation of
